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RESPONSES
AUTONOMY AND AGENCY
THOMAS E. HILL, JR.*
Many feminists and communitarians have raised sigmficant
objections to the way that liberal theorists conceive human
agents and their capacities. In particular, they object to any as-
sumption that, regardless of circumstance, human beings are,
can be, or ought to be autonomous.' The criticism often is accept-
ed as sufficient grounds for rejecting liberalism, but Professor
Abrams, wisely I think, explores the possibility that the impor-
tant points the critics make can be taken up in a reconstructed
liberalism-or at least acknowledged and used within a legal
framework that retains liberal features. Abrams is well aware,
however, that there are many different ideas of autonomy float-
ing about in contemporary philosophy, just as there are many
* Kenan Professor, Philosophy Department, Umversity of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill. I am grateful to Kathryn Abrams for her stimulating paper, to the other par-
ticipants at the "Reconstructing Liberalism" conference for their comments, and to
the editors of the William and Mary Law Review for their help.
1. For variations on this theme, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM]; WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva Feder Kittay &
Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987); Jean Bethke Eshtam, The Communitaran Individual,
in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNI-
TIES 99 (Amita Etziom ed., 1995) [hereinafter NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING]; Mi-
chael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
in NEW COMIMUNITARIAN THINKING, supra. For communitanan objections, see Neera
K. Badhwar, Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1
(1996); Amy Gutmann, Communitaran Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
309 (1985); Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, in NEW
COmUNITARIAN THINKING, supra. For feminist objections, see ALISON M. JAGGAR,
FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
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different feminist and communitarian perspectives.2 To focus
discussion, therefore, she concentrates on explicit discussions of
autonomy by Joel Feinberg' and Gerald Dworkin 4 and a selected
mix of feminist conceptions of how women express their agency
under conditions of oppression.5 Her ultimate aim is to "high-
light" and "foster" women's agency though the law, which I as-
sume means promoting, in various legal contexts, a proper rec-
ognition that women in oppressive conditions can be self-direct-
ing in special ways that do not fit the liberal models of autono-
mous agency.6 By calling attention to social realities that ab-
stract liberal theory may overlook,7 her discussion challenges
liberals to consider seriously whether, and how, liberal theory
should be modified in the light of a more sensitive awareness of
social conditions that fall far short of their ideals.
This is a worthy project. Though questions may be raised
about the details of the argument so far, it seems more consis-
tent with the admirable spirit of Abrams's exploratory paper for
a commentator to try to add something constructive, even if only
briefly. What I want to do is make some suggestions about the
different ways in which ideas of agency are used in liberal theory,
for that is important background for thinking about what con-
ceptions of agency are appropriate for each purpose. Although
there are many liberal theories, the distinctions that I will men-
tion are drawn mostly from reflecting on the work of John
Rawls.8 Feinberg and Dworkin offer explicit descriptions of au-
2. See, e.g., THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY (John
Christman ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE INNER CrrADEL] (presenting various concep-
tions of autonomy). This work also contains a good bibliography. See id. at 259-64.
3. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives in
Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 808-10 (1999). For Feinberg's original
discussion, see Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note 2, at 27.
4. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 810-12. For Dworkin's original discussion, see
Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note 2, at
54.
5. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 813-17. In particular, Abrams offers an extensive
discussion of the work of Diana Meyers. See, e.g., Diana T. Meyers, Personal Auton-
omy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, 84 J. PHIL. 619 (1987).
6. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 805.
7. See id, at 824-29.
8. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLs, JuSTICE];
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM].
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tonomous agents,9 but neither proposes a systematic liberal po-
litical theory comparable to Rawls's. The questions are, then,
where and how such a systematic liberal theory employs a spe-
cial conception of an agent. We need to determine these roles for
agency in liberal theory before we can decide reasonably wheth-
er to replace the liberal conception with an alternative or modi-
fied conception drawn from feminist observations of women un-
der oppression.
(1) Agents conceived as part of an idealized perspective for
reasoning about principles of justice. One prominent place in
which Rawls uses a special idea of an agent is in what he calls
"the original position."10 He does so in the context of a thought
experiment designed to lend support to two principles concern-
ing the justice of basic social institutions. Rawls describes
agents as rational, mutually disinterested, and unbelievably
knowledgeable regarding general facts, but as operating behind
a "veil of ignorance" that prevents them from knowing their gen-
der, race, class, personal relationships, culture, history, and even
the century in which they live." They all are moved by exactly
the same thing, a concern to maximize their share of "social pri-
mary goods,"12 which are supposed to be goods that any rational
person is expected to want.1" Rawls does not call these hypothet-
ical members of the original position autonomous, but he argues
that real persons can be seen as expressing their own nature as
rational autonomous persons when they act from respect for the
principles of justice that the imagined members would adopt."
We can critique Rawls's use of this thought experiment, as
many already have, but it seems clear that it would be no im-
provement to replace the "members" (as Rawls defines them)
with agents described in Abrams's feminist account of women's
9. See Feinberg, supra note 3; Dworkin, supra note 4.
10. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 17-22; RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at
22-28.
11. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 136-42; RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note
8, at 305.
12. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 90-95; RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at
307-09.
13. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 307-09.
14. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 513-20.
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agency. This is no criticism of that account when used for other
purposes, but Rawls's aim requires extreme stipulations of ratio-
nality, knowledge, and abstraction from particular conditions of
our social world. Otherwise, he has no hope of ensuring the
agreement of the members, the fairness of the resulting princi-
ples, or the universal implications that he claims for the theory.
Rawls's critics often object that, because his original position
must abstract from current social realities, the resulting princi-
ples of justice must be inappropriate for our world where values
are diverse, individuals have their own particular identities, and
rationality often is stunted and expressed in ways that liberal
theory does not discuss or perhaps even recognize.1 5 Whether the
objection is apt is not easy to determine because Rawls's theory
(as initially presented) is (largely) an exercise in "ideal theory,"
directly applicable only in the unreal conditions of a "well-or-
dered" society with a shared commitment to common principles
of justice. 6 Even Rawls's later Political Liberalism, which takes
into account "the fact of pluralism," does not discuss whether
and how liberal institutions need to adjust to the forms of wom-
en's agency that Abrams describes. 7 The proper place for ad-
dressing such questions, according to A Theory of Justice, would
be at a "legislative stage." 8 In Political Liberalism, Rawls sug-
15. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989);
ONORA O'NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE (1996); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra
note 1, at 161-64.
16. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 8-10, 243-51, 453-62. Ideal theory at-
tempts to work out the principles of justice for specified conditions that do not per-
fectly match conditions in the real world. See id. at 8-10. For example, it asks what
the principles of justice would be for a world in which everyone shares a common
comprehensive conception of justice and there is "strict compliance" with the laws by
everyone. See id at 8. Rawls holds that the project of ideal theory is a fundamental
part of the theory of justice, but it is not the only part. See id. at 9. To apply the
theory to real world conditions, for example, we need to address the special prob-
lems of partial compliance and diversity of reasonable opinions about justice. See i&l
at 8-10. But see Richard W. Miller, Rawls and Marxism, in READING RAWLS 206
(Norman Daniels ed., 1989) (offering a Marxist criticism of Rawls's theory); Thomas
Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS, supra, at 1 (offering a generally admir-
ing review of Rawls, offers a critique of Rawls's abstracting from individual "concep-
tions of the good").
17. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 141.
18. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 195-201.
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gests that the problem should be addressed through public dis-
cussion within a society, according to procedures compatible
with political principles of justice towards which, it is hoped, an
overlapping consensus of reasonable persons with quite different
moral perspectives will develop gradually.19 Whether these rec-
ommendations are adequate, though, remains an open question.
(2) Agents conceived as having rights of self-determination.
Another role for a conception of agency in liberal theory is to
characterize a set of rights that agents, so conceived, are pre-
sumed to have. As Feinberg noted, one idea of "autonomous
agents" is that of agents entitled to make certain decisions for
themselves without undue interference from others." Here au-
tonomous agents are defined not by their capacities or their ac-
tive powers, but by their rights-the responsibility of others to
allow them to choose regarding matters significantly affecting
their lives, assuming their choices are appropriately respectful of
the similar rights of others. 1 In Rawls's theory, the rights in
question are not explicitly attributed to "autonomy," but corre-
spond to the general rights of citizens under the first principle of
liberty.22
Again, doubts can be raised about any particular philosophical
attempt to define the rights of autonomous persons, but it does
not seem a promising way of improving the lot of oppressed
women simply to replace the broad, inclusive conceptions of the
rights of autonomy characteristic of liberal theorists with more
specific, contextually defined conceptions of women's agency un-
der oppression.2 ' Granted, the latter should be acknowledged in
19. Here, again, Rawls does not discuss the issue directly, but for the relevant
ideas of "rational autonomy," "overlapping consensus," and "public reason." See
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 77-81, 134-72, 212-54.
20. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 46-49; see also THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Autonomy
and Benevolent Lies, in AUTONOMY AND SELF-REsPEcT 31-34 (1991) (discussing au-
tonomy as a right); David A. J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, in THE INNER CITA-
DEL, supra note 2, at 207 (discussing Rousseau and Kant on autonomy).
21. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 46-49.
22. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 60-65, 195-257.
23. For suggestions about the possible roles of autonomy compatible with feminist
theory, see Sharon Hill, Self-Determination and Autonomy, in TODAY'S MORAL PROB-
LEMS 171-86 (Richard Wasserstrom ed., 1975); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Importance
of Autonomy, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 129-38 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T.
1999]
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ways that help to overcome oppressive conditions while not fur-
ther disadvantaging women, but it would not serve these inter-
ests to impose more limits on the freedom of women to choose
their own lives without coercion and manipulation from others.
Typically, liberals assume quite minimal standards of "compe-
tence" to qualify for the rights associated with autonomy, stan-
dards that exclude young children and extreme cases of mental
incapacity but include all those that Abrams describes as having
agency limited by oppression.24 Certainly the ideals of function-
ing in a fully autonomous way described by Dworkin and
Feinberg25 are not meant to be prerequisites of civil liberties or
of the right not to be unduly coerced or manipulated by others
(i.e., the right of "autonomy"). The problem for liberals is not so
much that they define the individual rights in a broad way with-
out reference to our particular identities and oppression-bred
limitations; rather, if there is a problem, it may be that some
liberal theories or institutions have taken for granted unreason-
ably restrictive standards of "competence" to qualify for the
rights of autonomous choice. This concerns a different use of
ideas of agency, to which I turn next.
(3) Agents conceived as those competent to have rights. Any
full theory of rights, liberal or otherwise, must take a stand on
what it takes to qualify for rights. Inanimate objects, everyone
agrees, do not qualify; trees are sometimes, but only rarely, said
to have rights; 6 whether some nonhuman animals qualify is
controversial.2" What human beings must be like to qualify for
various rights also may be a contested issue, for it is relevant to
Meyers eds., 1987); Jane Kneler, The Aesthetic Dimension of Kantian Autonomy, in
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMANUEL KANT, 173-89 (Robin May Schott ed., 1997).
24. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 825-29.
25. See Feinberg, supra note 3; Dworkin, supra note 4.
26. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Tibor R. Machan, Do Animals Have Rights?, 5 PUB. AFF. Q. 163
(1991); P. Singer, Not for Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental
Issues, in ETHICS AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 191 (K.E. Goodpaster &
KM. Sayre eds., 1979).
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legal issues regarding wills,2" contracts,29 voting, ° criminal tri-
als,"1 and no doubt other matters. Anyone who claimed that only
those who satisfy Dworkin and Feinberg's ideals of autonomy
have rights in these contexts would be dangerously elitist, but,
to my knowledge, no liberal theorist has made such a claim.
Rawls does not take up this issue. His stipulations in Political
Liberalism on what counts as being "reasonable," it should be
noted, concern the sort of consensus that he thinks liberals
should hope for; they are not a precondition of full legal rights. 2
A problem may still exist, however, if liberals do not appreciate
the phenomena of women's agency to which Abrams calls atten-
tion. In practice, liberal institutions may overlook subtle evi-
dence of competent, self-directed activity in oppressed persons,
especially women, who otherwise might seem unqualified to
speak for themselves in legal matters. This problem is not neces-
sarily a deep one in liberal theory, but it may be an important
practical problem that Abrams's work can help to identify and
correct.
(4) Agents conceived as the kind of persons we should strive to
be. Beyond all of the above, some moral and political philoso-
phers-liberal and conservative alike-put forward an ideal of
individual character in which being an autonomous person is
central.33 Whether this is a good idea is debatable within virtue
theory, but liberal political theory has no commitment to it as
such, apart from the concern that citizens be competent to take
up their responsibilities in a (liberal) democratic political sys-
tem.' The ideal has been prominent in philosophy of educa-
tion,35 but Rawls and other liberals should be very reluctant to
28. See 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills §§ 54-64 (1975).
29. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 23-24 (1991).
30. See 25 AM1. JULR 2D Elections §§ 103-78 (1996).
31. See 21 AMl. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 37-128 (1981).
32. See RAWIS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 48-66.
33. See, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988);
LAWRENCE HAWORTH, AUTONOMY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
ETHICS (1986); HILL, supra note 20, at 35-37; Feinberg, supra note 3, at 43-45.
34. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 28-30.
35. See, e.g., IL F. Dearden, Autonomy and Education, in EDUCATION AND THE DE-
VELOPiENT OF REASON 448, 451-52 (R.F. Dearden et al. eds., 1972); R.F. Dearden,
Autonomy as an Educational Ideal I, in PHILOSOPHERS DISCUSS EDUCATION 3 (S.C.
8531999]
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give theoretical (as opposed to personal) endorsement to any spe-
cific ideal of character (beyond some minimal virtues of citizen-
ship). Particular ideals propose a conception of the good for indi-
viduals about which reasonable persons in a pluralistic world
can disagree. Although Rawls may personally believe in a "com-
prehensive moral theory" that endorses the ideal, his liberalism
commits him not to insist on it in a political or legal arena.36
Would this ideal of autonomy be better replaced, at least for
women, by a more realistically attainable ideal of women's agency
as characterized by Abrams? If oppressive social conditions really
make the former unattainable or undesirable, the proposal
might well be warranted. Given that assumption, however, it is
not clear that the proposal would be incompatible with liberal
theory. In any case, the major concern of liberals and feminists
should be to eliminate the oppressive conditions that restrict the
possibilities for women's self-directed activities, rather than
merely to adjust to them.
(5) Agents taken to be the real persons to whom theories must
apply. In various ways, explicitly or implicitly, political and legal
theories make use of conceptions of what people are actually
like. For example, they may consider the sort of capacity for au-
tonomy that people have, how often and in what ways people
realize that capacity, and so on.3" Moral and political philoso-
phers often have made sweeping claims about human nature,"
but, of course, for most practical purposes, the important thing
is whether the theories' conceptions adequately reflect impor-
Brown ed., 1975); Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal
Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980).
36. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 201-06.
37. See generally HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 12 (discussing the applications of
autonomy to classical Greek political thought).
38. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN (Richard E. Flathman & David
Johnston eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (1651); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., Dent 1984) (1781); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon, ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690);
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1859); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Henry J.
Tozer trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1895); see also RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra
note 8, at 453-512 (offering a contemporary example of this practice with respect to
developmental psychology).
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tant, stable features of the persons to whom the theories are
applied, and whether these features are historically conditioned.
Thus, there are further questions that we must ask, such as:
(1) Do the liberal theories always presuppose a mistaken, unre-
alistic conception of what we, as those to whom the theories
must apply, are actually like?; (2) if liberal theories misconceive
what real persons are like, rather than merely simplifying and
abstracting as general theories must, how exactly do their mis-
conceptions lead to unwarranted practical conclusions?; and
(3) what significant improvements would be made if, as Abrams
proposes, liberal conceptions of real agents (as those to whom
theories must apply) were replaced, or modified, by a more real-
istic conception, including a better understanding of the agency
of women in oppressive conditions? 9 The answers to the first
two questions are far from obvious, even though confusion about
the role of conceptions of agency in liberal theory might lead one
to think otherwise.40 Once we are clear about these matters, we
can turn to the third question, which seems to be Abrams's main
concern.
All of these questions undeniably are difficult and controver-
sial. What I want to stress, in conclusion, is just that we can
make better progress on them if we keep them clear and distinct
from the special conceptions of agency that liberals sometimes
employ, not as factual descriptions but as ideals and idealiza-
tions for various theoretical purposes. Liberal political theories
employ different conceptions of agency, with various kinds and
degrees of abstraction and idealization for different purposes;
and it would be a mistake to take all these as attempts to give
full, realistic descriptions of human psychology, in general or in
historical context. Abstraction and idealization in theory, even
39. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 822.
40. If one did not separate the various roles that conceptions of agency play in
liberal theory (as I have tried to do), then one might think that the answer to the
first question is an easy affirmative, i.e., liberal theories always presuppose a mis-
taken, unrealistic view of what real human beings are actually like. This, in turn,
might make the second question seem easy to answer: for example, that liberal theo-
ries (such as Rawls's) urge us to try to make all our important political decisions
from behind the impartial "veil of ignorance," thereby turning a blind eye to the so-
cial realities of prejudice, capacities diminished by oppressive circumstandes, etc.
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when well intentioned, carry risks that the resulting principles
may be inappropriate to our situation; if the goal is to try to ar-
ticulate ideals and how best to reach them, however, philosophy
must move beyond mere description of how things actually are.4'
A liberal theory, such as Rawls's, does not claim that we are in
fact just like members of the original position, that despite op-
pressive conditions all persons are equally able to exercise
meaningfully their rights of autonomy, or that the only good life
for us is a maxmally self-directed life. If he and other liberals
failed to appreciate fully the ways in which oppressive condi-
tions limit and shape women's agency, it still remains to be
worked out what liberal theory must change when a better un-
derstanding is achieved. This is the main project that Abrams
pursues. My ann in these comments merely has been to sug-
gest where in liberal theory attention can be most productively
focused.
41. See ONEILL, supra note 15, at 39-44 (distingmshing between idealization and
abstraction in moral and political theory). O'Neill argues that abstraction is neces-
sary, but idealization is dangerous. See ud. at 40-41. Like Rawls, I think that for
certain purposes, and if used with deliberate caution, idealizations can, and should,
serve an important role in moral and political theory. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hill, Jr.,
A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 285 (1992)
(Etlucs Series No. 6, 1992); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., A Kantian Perspective on Political
Violence, 1 J. ETHICS 105 (1997).
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